03 - 08 - 07

August 3-9, 2007 - Vol. XIX, No. 24, The Friday Times, Pakistan

Internal Security Threats: Counter-Terrorism

Let the moderates decide

by Henry Wilkinson

Mr Musharraf wants people to believe that only he, as head of the military, is capable of defeating extremism in Pakistan. He hasn't done so yet. Something needs to change.

There are remarkably similar lessons from what happened at Lal Masjid, and what has been happening in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in Lebanon. In the camps in Lebanon, the Lebanese government has historically left matters to the Palestinians. In this uncontrolled environment, violent jihadi groups have been free to operate and build capability. When the Lebanese government finally moved to act against Fatah al-Islam in Nahr al-Bared, a long and bloody fight was guaranteed. The militants of Fatah al-Islam may have known they couldn't win the battle, but their defiance was a wider call to their extremist brothers-in-arms that now is the time to rise up.

The story of Lal Masjid is not dissimilar. A militant group, possibly former Jaish-e Mohammed members, had taken over and were allowed to flourish. Their activity reached an inevitable point where they were directly challenging the authority of the state. The decision to assault the mosque cannot have been any easier than the decision made by the Lebanese government to take on Fatah al-Islam. Typically, it seems clear in both cases that hardcore militants were itching for a fight, regardless of the safety of others inside. Sadly, President Pervez Musharraf appeared to have little choice but to act as he did; it was too late for anything else. For any government that claims to be moderate, the logic is clear: tolerating the zealously intolerant is a self-defeating choice.

Like in Lebanon, it is apparent that in the wake of a major, and very destructive, counter-terrorism operation, various terror groups in Pakistan will now take the fight back to the government with a vengeance. Indeed, they are already doing so. A long struggle lies ahead. No one should be under any illusions: removing the tumour of extremism in Pakistan will be slow, ugly and painful. But equally, the cure must be holistic to succeed, and it is because of this that Mr Musharraf needs to think very carefully indeed about his role as civilian president or military leader.

The lessons of other successful counter-terrorism campaigns are clear: Mr Musharraf needs fresh political legitimacy to win this fight. Clinging on to doing the same as he has done since he took power is unsustainable given his objectives. Co-opting Islamists and the radical right is not a solution; their extreme fringe has shown that sooner or later they will lash out anyway. Their goals and those of mainstream Pakistan are diametrically at odds. Only by releasing his grip on Pakistan's mainstream, and enabling the vast majority of moderate Pakistanis to take their country back from extremism and militarisation, will Mr Musharraf (or his successor) ultimately defeat terrorism.

Successful counter-terrorism campaigns always have a strong political component. For Musharraf this means the military must be used deftly, and in a limited and highly targeted fashion to avoid innocent deaths and handing propaganda victories to extremists. The objectives of the government must be to isolate terrorists from the rest of society and to cut them off from external external support. This requires a clear vision of what must be achieved and how, and that seems to be lacking with Mr Musharraf. Terrorists should not be dignified with the status of belligerents, as conferred through large military operations. They must become criminals, to be regarded as such by the public and treated as such by the authorities. It is hard to see how a head of the army as head of state can pull that off.

Welfare not warfare will ultimately prevent extremism from reproducing. Without exception all madrassas, like nearly all other education systems in the world, need to be brought to heel and carefully regulated and looked after, to stifle hateful ideologies infecting young minds. This requires robust political reform and rigorous action, which cannot be done without popular legitimacy.

If Mr Musharraf is genuine about democracy and moderation over extremism, he must demonstrate this by becoming an elected civilian president with a full democratic civilian mandate. He cannot credibly fight in the name of moderation as a military dictator. Nor can he focus on a difficult campaign against terrorism if he is fending off the ire of the disenfranchised moderate population he claims to represent.

It is true that in some parts of the country a military option is needed, such as the tribal regions in the North West. Yet even here history has shown us that exclusively military solutions do not defeat insurgencies. Conflicts in Israel and Palestine, Nigeria, and Lebanon are all examples of how the military on its own is a blunt weapon that usually stirs the beast rather than slays it.

Perhaps for the tribal areas the lessons of Iraq are most applicable. Even Iraqi resistance is now turning on Al Qaeda, because of its repulsive violence towards fellow Muslims, despite US military heavy-handedness. Mr Musharraf would therefore do well to persist in letting the tribes of the North West Frontier know exactly what they are in for if they continue to help Al Qaeda. If he can win the confidence of Pakistan in an election, he has a better chance of winning the confidence of the tribes and isolating the extremists from them as well. Bombing them instead is unlikely to change their minds.

Mr Musharraf wants people to believe that only he, as head of the military, is capable of defeating extremism in Pakistan. He hasn't done so yet. Something needs to change. If, as he says, it is a conflict between "extremists" and "moderates", maybe he should let the overwhelming majority of Pakistan, the moderate population, decide who is the best person for the job. If that turns out to be him anyway, he has a far better chance of succeeding.

Henry Wilkinson is a terrorism analyst at international firm Janusian Security Risk Management